art, or through any other media o f his choice. Similarly, under the ACHPR, Article 19 provides thus: - Every individual shall have the right to receive information and [e]very individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinionswithin the law. It is thus explicit that the above provisions of the CURT and those of UDHR, ICCPR and ACHPR all recognise that people [including the Petitioner] have fundamental rights to receive seek and disseminate information without restrictions subject only to the law of the relevant state. The Petitioner's counsel submitted that, applying the law to the rights of the Petitioner and having regard to his claimed reliance on the use of Clubhouse and mindful of the fact that the Respondents have not stated anywhere in their evidence that Clubhouse operations in Tanzania are currently restricted, we are of the view that there is a distinction between access to the Clubhouse as a fundamental right and its alleged restriction. Thus, the Petitioner's claim that he has fundamental rights under the CURT and under UDHR, ICCPR and ACPHR to seek, receive and disseminate information; ideas and opinion through the use of Clubhouse is quite different from the restriction to access alleged by the Respondents. Nevertheless, the rights are subject to lawful restrictions. This issue should not detain us much. It is evident that access to the Clubhouse as Internet based application that enable citizens including the Petitioner to access information and enabling him to exercise his freedom of expression is a fundamental right. This is based on the functional equivalence principle that the rights enjoyed in the real world are also enjoyed in the cyberspace. Several legal instruments have touched upon these rights such as the African Union Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, 2019; and the Council of Europe Guide to Human 11