[2021] 2 MLRA Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor 469 [127] The Content Code in s 2.0 of Part 1 imposes a duty on the 1st respondent as an ICH to ensure to the best of its ability that its content and comments contain no abusive or discriminatory material. The act of relying on its luck that others will alert it, cannot be the best that the 1st respondent can do. The precautionary measures taken by the 1st respondent are obviously inadequate to shield itself from liability. The 1st respondent must take responsibility for the impugned comments published in its platform. [128] The 1st respondent also cannot invoke s 3(3) of CMA to say that it is not allowed internet censorship in order to absolve its responsibilities. Both CMA and the Content Code viewed wholly have the overriding purpose of not only promoting self-regulation by internet service or content providers, but also to regulate and censure that communications that take place on each information platform do not violate the fundamental rights enjoyed by others. [129] The 1st respondent cannot insist on exercising its fundamental right and at the same time violate the right of others. A proper balance must be struck between the freedom of speech and expression enunciated and guaranteed in art 10 of the Federal Constitution and the need to protect the dignity and integrity of the courts and the judiciary. Case law are replete with this entrenched principle of law that the exercise of this right is never absolute given the phrase ‘subject to’ provision appearing at the forefront of art 10. [130] We acknowledge that the 1st respondent, Malaysiakini is recognised to have published matters of public interest. It had succeeded in promoting and cultivating the culture of expressing one’s thought on the subject of the articles published in line with its twin objectives of encouraging readership and generating public discussion for the purpose of giving its readers to form informed views. [131] The 1st respondent ought to have known that by allowing so, it is exposed to the real risk of the nature and content of comments on the articles that it published. The 1st respondent agreed that the nature of the impugned comments is so offensive and not something that it condones. [132] On the facts before us and for all the reasons we have elucidated above, we are satisfied that a case of contempt beyond reasonable doubt had been made out against the 1st respondent. In this, we reiterate that the explanations put forth by the 1st respondent that it had no knowledge, had failed to rebut the presumption against it, and hence failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the applicant’s case. [133] We find the charge for facilitating the publication of the impugned comments against the 1st respondent proved. We therefore hold the 1st respondent guilty of contempt of court.