Niemela v. Malamas Page 28 to which the hyperlink leads. Crookes did not address snippets and indeed Abella J. [42] Making reference to the existence and/or location of content by hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is not publication of that content. Only when a hyperlinker presents content from the hyperlinked material in a way that actually repeats the defamatory content, should that content be considered to be “published” by the hyperlinker. [Emphasis added.] [93] A snippet repeats words from the hyperlinked article and, as in the present case, those words can be defamatory. For example, the following text is taken from one snippet displayed in the Google search results of Mr. Niemela’s name: “Glenn J. Niemela complaint review: Glenn J. Niemela he’s a scam artist and steals from his clients while doing nothing to help them with their …”. [94] Using the traditional approach to publication, Google’s lack of awareness of the content of the words it repeated on a search page snippet would not prevent it from being a publisher, although it would likely be able to avail itself of the defence of innocent dissemination after the prima facie test for defamation had been made out. As Abella J. noted at para. 18 of Crookes: [18] Under this sole disseminator/sole reader paradigm, the breadth of activity captured by the traditional publication rule is vast. In R. v. Clerk (1728), 1 Barn. K.B. 304, 94 E.R. 207, for example, a printer’s servant, whose only role in an act of publication was to “clap down” the printing press, was found responsible for the libels contained in that publication, despite the fact that he was not aware of the contents (p. 207). In Hird v. Wood (1894), 38 S.J. 234 (C.A.), pointing at a sign displaying defamatory words was held to be evidence of publication. Other cases have also held that acts merely facilitating communication can amount to publication: see, e.g., Buchanan v. Jennings, [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 1 A.C. 115; Polson v. Davis, 635 F.Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986), aff’d 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990); Crain v. Lightner, 364 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1987), at p. 785; and Spike v. Golding (1895), 27 N.S.R. 370 (S.C. in banco). And in McNichol v. Grandy, the defendant was found to be liable when he raised his voice and made defamatory statements that were overheard by someone in another room. [95] As I have noted, however, the tenor of Crookes and of recent jurisprudence in England is to narrow the test for who is a publisher of defamatory material to those who do deliberate acts. In Canada this shift originates in the Supreme Court of 2015 BCSC 1024 (CanLII) stated at para. 42: