Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (citation omitted). Consistent with the overbreadth doctrine’s rationale, the Supreme Court has only applied it where there is a substantial risk that the challenged law will chill protected speech or association. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817–18 (1975) (declining to address facial overbreadth challenge where statutory amendment removed risk that statute “will chill the rights of others”); Law Students C.R. Rsch. Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 167 (1971) (denying facial relief where “careful administration” of state regulatory scheme could avoid “chilling effects upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms”). The Court has also instructed that “the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine” that should be employed “only as a last resort.” L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999) (quotation omitted). And the overbreadth doctrine’s function “attenuates” as the regulated expression moves from “pure speech toward conduct.” Id. at 40 (quotation omitted). 2. The overbreadth doctrine does not apply to Section 7. That’s for three reasons. First, the primary concern of overbreadth doctrine is to avoid chilling speech. But Section 7 does not chill speech; instead, it chills censorship. So there can be no concern that declining to facially invalidate HB 20 will inhibit the marketplace of ideas or discourage commentary on matters of public concern. Perhaps as-applied challenges to speculative, now-hypothetical enforcement actions will delineate boundaries to the law. But in the meantime, HB 20’s prohibitions on censorship will cultivate rather than stifle the marketplace of ideas that justifies the overbreadth doctrine in the first place. 12