Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 26 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 The cornerstone of the Court’s reasoning was that the parade sponsors were “intimately connected” to the message communicated by the parade. Id. at 576. This intimate connection was crucial, the Court held, because forcing the sponsors to include a particular float was tantamount to forcing the sponsors to speak: “[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message is compromised.” Id. at 576; see also id. at 573 (emphasizing that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message,” including by “decid[ing] what not to say”) (quotation omitted). The final case that’s particularly relevant to our discussion is Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). Certain law schools sought to restrict military recruiting on their campuses because of the military’s policies on sexual orientation. Id. at 51. Congress responded by enacting the Solomon Amendment, which denied federal funding to schools that did not give military recruiters “access to students that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access provided other potential employers.” Id. at 54 (quotation omitted). An organization of law schools sued, arguing that the Solomon Amendment violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. It unanimously held that “the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement,” and the statute thus did not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds. Id. at 60. The Court first held that the Solomon Amendment did not impermissibly force the law schools to speak. Id. at 61–62. The Court recognized that “recruiting assistance provided by the schools often includes elements of speech”—like sending emails or posting bulletin board notices on the recruiter’s behalf. Id. at 61. But the Court determined that this speech was “plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of 26