chilling effect on expression protected by the First Amendment, the key concern of the overbreadth doctrine. Id. at 174 (quotations omitted). Conversely, in State v. Muccio, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (2016), which prohibits an adult from participating in the electronic transmission of information relating to or describing the sexual conduct of any person, if the communication is directed at a child and the adult acts with the specific intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person, is not substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. 890 N.W.2d 914, 917-18 (Minn. 2017). The supreme court reasoned in part that “because of its specific-intent requirement, the statute does not target broad categories of speech.” Id. at 928 (citation omitted); see also State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 533, 539 (Minn. 2016) (holding that “Minnesota Statutes § 609.322, subd. 1a(1)-(2) (2014), which criminalizes the promotion of prostitution and the solicitation of individuals to practice prostitution, is not substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment” in part because the statute criminalizes the solicitation and promotion of individuals to engage in sexual conduct only if the sexual conduct is done for the purpose of satisfying the actor’s sexual impulses). This court has similarly considered the impact of a specific-intent requirement in an overbreadth analysis. See Stockwell, 770 N.W.2d at 539; Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 566. Most recently, in Linert v. MacDonald, this court held that Minn. Stat. § 211B.02 (2016), which prohibits candidates from knowingly making false claims of support or endorsement, is not facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. 901 N.W.2d 19