29/09/2023, 12:35
SANCHEZ v. FRANCE - 45581/15 (Judgment : No Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{general} : Grand Chamber) [2023] ECHR 418 (1…
meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision
to enable a person to regulate his or her conduct. That person must be able
- if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action
may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute
certainty. A law which confers a discretion is thus not in itself inconsistent
with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the
discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient
clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to
give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see
Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary [GC], no. 201/17, § 94, 20
January 2020, with further references). Whilst certainty is desirable, it
may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep
pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably
couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and
whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy et Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 143;
Delfi AS, cited above, § 121; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July
v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 41, ECHR 2007‑I). The
level of precision required of domestic legislation - which cannot provide
for every eventuality - depends to a considerable degree on the content of
the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and
status of those to whom it is addressed (see NIT S.R.L., cited above,
§ 160; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above,
§ 144; and Delfi AS, cited above, § 122).
126. A margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not
therefore by itself make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application.
Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one
construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of “foreseeability”
for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication vested in the
courts serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain,
taking into account the changes in everyday practice (see
Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, cited above, § 97, and Gorzelik and Others
v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 65, ECHR 2004‑I).
127. At the same time, the Court is aware that there must come a day
when a given legal norm is applied for the first time (see NIT S.R.L., cited
above, § 159; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, cited above, § 97; and
Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 115,
ECHR 2015). The novel character of a legal question that has not hitherto
been raised, particularly with regard to previous decisions, is not in itself
incompatible with the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability of
the law, provided the solution adopted is consistent with one of the
possible and reasonably foreseeable interpretations (see, mutatis
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