22 MAGYAR JETI ZRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT creation of the link – a natural exception being if the hyperlink points to content controlled by the same person. Additionally, the content behind the hyperlink has already been made available by the initial publisher on the website to which it leads, providing unrestricted access to the public. 76. Consequently, given the particularities of hyperlinks, the Court cannot agree with the domestic courts’ approach equating the mere posting of a hyperlink with the dissemination of defamatory information, automatically entailing liability for the content itself. Instead, it considers that the issue of whether the posting of a hyperlink may justifiably, from the perspective of Article 10, give rise to such liability requires an individual assessment in each case, regard being had to a number of elements. 77. The Court identifies in particular the following aspects as relevant for its analysis of the liability of the applicant company as publisher of a hyperlink: (i) did the journalist endorse the impugned content; (ii) did the journalist repeat the impugned content (without endorsing it); (iii) did the journalist merely include a hyperlink to the impugned content (without endorsing or repeating it); (iv) did the journalist know or could he or she reasonably have known that the impugned content was defamatory or otherwise unlawful; (v) did the journalist act in good faith, respect the ethics of journalism and perform the due diligence expected in responsible journalism? 78. In the present case the Court notes that the article in question simply mentioned that an interview conducted with J.Gy. was to be found on YouTube and provided a means to access it through a hyperlink, without further comments on, or repetition even of parts of, the linked interview itself. No mention was made of the political party at all. 79. The Court observes that nowhere in the article did the author imply in any way that the statements accessible through the hyperlink were true or that he approved of the hyperlinked material or accepted responsibility for it. Neither did he use the hyperlink in a context that, in itself, conveyed a defamatory meaning. It can thus be concluded that the impugned article did not amount to an endorsement of the impugned content. 80. In connection with the question of repetition, the Court reiterates that “punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so” (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 35, Series A no. 298; Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, § 62, ECHR 2001-III § 62; and Novaya Gazeta and Milashina v. Russia, no. 45083/06, § 71, 3 October 2017). A general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas (see Thoma, cited above § 64). With these principles in mind, the Court would not rule out the possibility that, in certain particular constellations of circumstances, even the mere repetition of a statement, for example in