MAGYAR JETI ZRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 23 addition to a hyperlink, may potentially engage the question of liability. This could include situations where a journalist does not act in good faith in accordance with the ethics of journalism and with the diligence expected in responsible journalism dealing with a matter of public interest (see in this respect, for example, Novaya Gazeta and Milashina, cited above, § 72). However, this was not the case in the present application, where, as observed above, the article in question repeated none of the defamatory statements, and the publication was indeed limited to posting the hyperlink. 81. As to whether the journalist and the applicant company knew or could reasonably have known that the hyperlink provided access to defamatory or otherwise unlawful content, the Court notes at the outset that the domestic courts, with the exception of the first-instance court, did not find this aspect relevant, and therefore did not examine it. The Court also considers that this issue must be determined in the light of the situation as it presented itself to the author at the material time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight on the basis of the findings of the domestic courts’ judgments. At this juncture, the Court reiterates that an attack on personal honour and reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see Delfi AS, cited above, § 137, and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 83). Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician – or a political party – as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike private individuals, politicians and political parties inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance (see Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 46, ECHR 2007-IV). 82. Relying on these principles, the Court considers that the journalist in the present case could reasonably have assumed that the content to which he provided access, although perhaps controversial, would remain within the realm of permissible criticism of political parties and, as such, would not be unlawful. Although the statements by J.Gy. were ultimately found to be defamatory because they implied, without a factual basis, that persons associated with Jobbik had committed acts of a racist nature, the Court is satisfied that such utterances could not be seen as clearly unlawful from the outset (contrast Delfi AS, cited above, §§ 136 and 140). 83. Furthermore, it must be noted that the relevant Hungarian law, as interpreted by the competent domestic courts, excluded any meaningful assessment of the applicant company’s freedom-of-expression rights under Article 10 of the Convention, in a situation where restrictions would have required the utmost scrutiny, given the debate on a matter of general interest. Indeed, the courts held that the hyperlinking amounted to dissemination of information and imposed objective liability – a course of action that effectively precluded any balancing between the competing rights, that is to say, the right to reputation of the political party and the right to freedom of expression of the applicant company (see, mutatis