32 MAGYAR JETI ZRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT - SEPARATE OPINION 14. The repetition by a journalist of defamatory or otherwise unlawful content, accompanied by a hyperlink to the source of the content, is also equated to traditional forms of publication. Where the journalist acted in good faith and in accordance with professional ethics and the due diligence expected in responsible journalism, such repetition does not make him or her liable for that content27. By contrast, where the journalist acted in bad faith, breached professional ethics and did not perform the aforementioned due diligence, he or she is liable for the defamatory or otherwise unlawful content. This means that the obligations incumbent on a journalist who posts the hyperlink are obligations of means and not of result. 15. All defences available to primary publishers28 should be available to the creators of the hyperlink if they are subject to liability in respect of linked content. The logic underlying equal treatment is that, as the United Nations Human Rights Council states, “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”29. 16. In cases where the journalist repeats the content to which the hyperlink leads, the Court does not impose an obligation for the journalist to distance him or herself formally from that content. The same applies a fortiori where the journalist simply creates the hyperlink without endorsing or repeating the content to which it leads. 17. The simple use of a hyperlink, without endorsing or even repeating the unlawful content to which it leads, is not equated to traditional forms of publication. Hyperlinking in this case does not make the journalist liable for that content, save in the very exceptional circumstance of non-compliance with a binding judicial decision30. In this specific situation of disseminator does not appropriate the reported statements as his/her own” (German Federal Court, I ZR 191/08, 14 October 2010). That was also my point in the dissenting opinion annexed to Mouvement raëlien suisse, cited above. 27 Paragraph 80 of the judgment. 28 See, for example, Article 19, Defining Defamation: Principles on freedom of expression and prevention of reputation, Second, revised edition, 2017. 29 United Nations Human Rights Council, “The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet”, 27 June 2016, A/HRC/32/L20. 30 Paragraphs 28 and 81 of the judgment. A delicate situation may obtain in the case of illegal use of copyright-protected music, films and computer games by means of links to the copyrighted materials. In Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), no. 40397/12, 19 February 2013, the Court held that there were weighty reasons for the restriction of the applicants’ freedom of expression, because the applicants’ activities within the commercially run website “The Pirate Bay” amounted to criminal conduct requiring appropriate punishment. The aforesaid website made it possible for users to come into contact with each other through torrent files, which in practice function as Internet links. The Court had regard to the domestic courts’ finding that the applicants had not taken any action to remove the torrent files in question, despite having been urged to do so. This is not an undisputed view. The Supreme Court of Korea, in its judgment of 12 March 2015, decided that “even if users clicking on the link are forwarded to such web pages, etc., which may infringe a copyright holder’s right to reproduction or public transmission by posting copyrighted materials or transmitting copyrighted materials to Internet users