Cite as: 542 U. S. 656 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
and remand for trial on the merits. Applying this mode of
inquiry, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the preliminary
injunction. Our reasoning in support of this conclusion,
however, is based on narrower, more specific grounds than
the rationale the Court of Appeals adopted. The Court of
Appeals, in its opinion affirming the decision of the District
Court, construed a number of terms in the statute, and held
that COPA, so construed, was unconstitutional. None of
those constructions of statutory terminology, however, were
relied on by or necessary to the conclusions of the District
Court. Instead, the District Court concluded only that the
statute was likely to burden some speech that is protected
for adults, 31 F. Supp. 2d, at 495, which petitioner does not
dispute. As to the definitional disputes, the District Court
concluded only that respondents' interpretation was "not unreasonable," and relied on their interpretation only to conclude that respondents had standing to challenge the statute,
id., at 481, which, again, petitioner does not dispute. Because we affirm the District Court's decision to grant the
preliminary injunction for the reasons relied on by the District Court, we decline to consider the correctness of the
other arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals.
The District Court, in deciding to grant the preliminary
injunction, concentrated primarily on the argument that
there are plausible, less restrictive alternatives to COPA.
A statute that "effectively suppresses a large amount of
speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another ... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to
serve." Reno, 521 U. S., at 874. When plaintiffs challenge
a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be
as effective as the challenged statute. Ibid.