由此 -7- A B his editors had a legal, social or moral duty to publish the relevant article and whether the public had an interest in knowing about the matters in the C A B C article. D D E 25. Note, that insofar as reportage is concerned Reynolds E introduces a subtle but important adjustment to Lord Atkinson’s definition F of qualified privilege. G G 26. H I F Lord Atkinson spoke of an “occasion” of qualified privilege. But the Court of Appeal in Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (Nos.2-5) [2002] QB 783 (at §33) has observed that, whereas in the past one could H I talk of qualified privilege attaching to an “occasion,” where reportage is J K concerned “Reynolds privilege attaches, if at all, to the publication itself”. This is because “it is impossible to conceive of circumstances in which the J K occasion of publication could be privileged but the article itself not so”. L L M 27. Another key consequence of Reynolds (as Loutchansky pointed M out at §33) is that, in the special case of reportage, “little scope remains for N any subsequent finding of malice”. O O 28. P Q N Previously, one could speak of a defence of qualified privilege being defeated by malice (that is, recklessness or indifference as to whether a published statement is true or false, or making a statement with the P Q dominant motive of injuring a person). But Reynolds held that, in assessing R S R whether an article is covered by qualified privilege in the first place, the Court must objectively examine whether a journalist has acted responsibly S in compiling the article and whether the proprietor or editor of a news T T service has acted responsibly in allowing the article to be published. U U V V