WIEDER AND GUARNIERI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT person led to collection of the appellant’s communications, he was not harmed by that collection. Citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. (1990) and re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008), it stated that “the Fourth Amendment does not apply extra territorially to the surveillance of persons abroad, including United States citizens”. In its view, “[t]he protections extended by the Fourth Amendment to foreign individuals abroad, if any, are minimal and plainly outweighed by the paramount national interest in preventing foreign attacks on our nation and its people.” The court concluded that: “the government may lawfully collect, without a warrant and pursuant to Section 702, the e-mails of foreign individuals located abroad who reasonably appear to constitute a potential threat to the United States and, once it is lawfully collecting those emails, it does not need to seek a warrant, supported by probable cause, to continue to collect e-mails between that person and other individuals once it is learned that some of those individuals are United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, or are located in the United States.” 52. It continued: “[the appellant and the amici argued] that Verdugo-Urquidez does not control the outcome here because Section 702 collection occurs in the United States. Practically speaking, Section 702 surveillance could occur only within the United States, as the agencies can compel only ISPs located in the United States to provide e-mails. But Fourth Amendment doctrine relating to wire or electronic communication does not focus on the location where the communication takes place. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the seminal Supreme Court decision on the interception of such communication, holds that a person’s privacy interest in his or her communications does not depend on whether the government physically intrudes into a physical space in which that person has a property interest or an expectation of physical privacy. What matters, and what implicates the protection of the Fourth Amendment, is the expectation of privacy in the communications themselves, and therefore a warrant is required to seize even those communications made in a public telephone booth. Conversely, by the same reasoning, a person who does not have a Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interest in his communications, such as a foreign national resident abroad, does not acquire such an interest by reason of the physical location of the intercepting device. At least where the communication is collected essentially in real time as it occurs, the targeted communication, whether conducted over telephone wires or via the internet, occurs in the relevant sense where the person whose calls or e-mails are being intercepted is located, regardless of the location of the means used to intercept it.” THE LAW I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 53. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment (Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court). 17