WIEDER AND GUARNIERI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT II. RECEIPT OF INTELLIGENCE FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 54. In their applications to the Court, the applicants complained under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that their electronic communications may have been obtained by virtue of the operation of the regime governing the receipt by the United Kingdom intelligence agencies of material intercepted by their foreign counterparts. However, they subsequently confirmed that, in light of the Court’s conclusions in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, 25 May 2021), they no longer wished to pursue those complaints. 55. The Court does not see any grounds of respect for human rights as set out in Article 37 § 1 in fine which would require it to continue the examination of those complaints, which may therefore be struck out pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. III. THE BULK INTERCEPTION REGIME A. Article 8 of the Convention 56. The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that, as a result of their work and contacts, their communications might have been intercepted, extracted, filtered, stored, analysed and disseminated by the United Kingdom intelligence agencies pursuant to the regime under section 8(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”). 57. Article 8 provides as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 1. Preliminary remarks 58. In Big Brother Watch and Others (cited above) the Court considered the Convention compliance of the bulk interception regime, which was operated pursuant to section 8(4) of RIPA. It identified certain weaknesses in that regime that gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, there was no independent authorisation of section 8(4) warrants, the categories of selectors used to search intercepted communications did not have to be included in the application for a warrant, and selectors linked to an individual were not subject to prior internal authorisation (ibid., §§ 377-82 and 425). 18