27/07/2023, 22:38 CURIA - Documents Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 151, and of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 82). 112 As regards the possibility of providing distinctive criteria other than a personal or geographic criterion for the targeted retention of traffic and location data, it is possible that other objective and nondiscriminatory criteria may be considered in order to ensure that the scope of a targeted retention measure is as limited as is strictly necessary and to establish a connection, at least indirectly, between serious criminal acts and the persons whose data are retained. However, since Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 refers to legislative measures of the Member States, it is for the latter and not for the Court to identify those criteria, it being understood that there can be no question of reinstating, by that means, the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 83). 113 In any event, as the Advocate General observed in point 50 of his Opinion, the fact that it may be difficult to provide a detailed definition of the circumstances and conditions under which targeted retention may be carried out is no reason for the Member States, by turning the exception into a rule, to provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 84). 114 As regards, secondly, the expedited retention of traffic and location data processed and stored by providers of electronic communications services on the basis of Articles 5, 6 and 9 of Directive 2002/58 or on the basis of legislative measures taken under Article 15(1) of that directive, it should be noted that those data must, in principle, be erased or made anonymous, depending on the circumstances, at the end of the statutory periods within which those data must be processed and stored in accordance with the national provisions transposing that directive. Nevertheless, the Court has held that during that processing and storage, situations may arise in which it becomes necessary to retain those data after those time periods have ended in order to shed light on serious criminal offences or acts adversely affecting national security; this is the case both in situations where those offences or acts having adverse effects have already been established and where, after an objective examination of all of the relevant circumstances, such offences or acts having adverse effects may reasonably be suspected (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 85). 115 In such a situation, in the light of the balance that must be struck between the rights and interests at issue referred to in paragraphs 65 to 68 above, it is permissible for Member States to provide, in legislation adopted pursuant to Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, for the possibility of instructing, by means of a decision of the competent authority subject to effective judicial review, providers of electronic communications services to undertake the expedited retention of traffic and location data at their disposal for a specified period of time (judgments of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 163, and of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 86). 116 To the extent that the purpose of that expedited retention no longer corresponds to the purpose for which those data were initially collected and retained and since any processing of data must, under Article 8(2) of the Charter, be consistent with specified purposes, Member States must make clear, in their legislation, for what purpose the expedited retention of data may occur. In the light of the serious nature of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter which such retention may entail, only actions to combat serious crime and, a fortiori, to safeguard national security are such as to justify such interference, on the condition that the measure and access to the retained data comply with the limits of what is strictly necessary, as set out in paragraphs 164 to 167 of the judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others (C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791) (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 87). 117 The Court has stated that a measure of retention of that nature need not be limited to the data of persons who have been identified previously as being a threat to public security or national security of the Member State concerned or of persons specifically suspected of having committed a serious criminal offence or acts adversely affecting national security. According to the Court, while it must https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=A4432EEFFE3535A201E714AE6441EE66?mode=DOC&pageIndex=1&docid=265881… 23/28