There are several things to note about exhibit D2 (ii). The email does not have the header which would have contained the time and date when it was transmitted. And at the bottom of the page there is another date of the 17th of April, 2010 and the full line reads as follows: http://127.0.0.1:4664/preview?event_id=6&q=dian+rates&s=fojhSh8...4/17/2 010. This code appears at each page of the email in issue. DW1 testified in cross examination that he had obtained this document through a Google search engine on the 17th of April 2010. The search revealed two documents namely exhibit D2 (i) and D2 (ii). Exhibit D2 (i) is revealed by the header to be from Nakiyingi Rebecca Rebecca.Nakiyingi@damco.com However D2 (ii) does not have the sender or receivers email addresses, neither does it have a date of sending. The email in contention is exhibit D2 (ii). Secondly D2 (i) though clearly dated and with senders address shown does not have the electronic data signature reproduced below as: http://127.0.0.1:4664/preview?event_id=6&q=dian+rates&s=fojhSh8...4/17/2 010, displayed at the bottom of the printout. It is therefore doubtful whether these two exhibits D2 (i) and D2 (ii) were accessed or printed out using the same process, search engine or computer devise. I agree with the plaintiffs that the process of authentication of exhibit D2 (ii) does not meet the requirements of section 7 of the Electronic Transactions Act cap 2011 and the case law cited. I am not persuaded that authentication by DW1 shows that this information was available through a process which ensured that it remained unaltered as it was in the original when it was sent. There is no satisfactory explanation by DW1 why the Google search engine was able to display the date it was sent and the address of the sender of the email in exhibit D2 (i) but this was not displayed in the case of exhibit D2 (ii) which is the email communicating the exclusion clause. However PW1 seems to have admitted that he and Jabez received the purported email when he was cross examined. As far as authentication relating to the receipt of the email is concerned, PW1 admits D2 (i) and says they received the other email exhibit D2 (ii) for the first time in April 2010. One may argue that the data displaying the sent/received email is with the plaintiff and adverse to the plaintiff and therefore deemed authenticated by showing it was sent under section 8 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2011. However the email does not have sufficient header/footnote automatically generated references for a conclusion to be made on this issue. I have taken into consideration submissions of the defendants Counsel that exhibit D2 (ii) was admitted as an exhibit by consent. Indeed the email was admitted by consent during the conferencing of the suit inter parties and therefore objection to admissibility is belated. Submission can 23