Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018 of his potential. And this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over fundamental personal choices and control over dissemination of personal information which may be infringed through an unauthorised use of such information. It is clear that Article 21, more than any of the other articles in the fundamental rights chapter, reflects each of these constitutional values in full, and is to be read in consonance with these values and with the international covenants that we have referred to. In the ultimate analysis, the fundamental right to privacy, which has so many developing facets, can only be developed on a case-to-case basis. Depending upon the particular facet that is relied upon, either Article 21 by itself or in conjunction with other fundamental rights would get attracted. S.K. Kaul, J. : 618. Rohinton F. Nariman, and Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., have emphasised the importance of the protection of privacy to ensure protection of liberty and dignity. I agree with them and seek to refer to some legal observations in this regard: 618.1. In Robertson and Nicol on Media Law [ Geoffrey Robertson, QC and Andrew Nicol, QC, Media Law, 5th Edn., p. 265.] it was observed: Individuals have a psychological need to preserve an intrusion-free zone for their personality and family and suffer anguish and stress when that zone is violated. Democratic societies must protect privacy as part of their facilitation of individual freedom, and offer some legal support for the individual choice as to what aspects of intimate personal life the citizen is prepared to share with others. This freedom in other words springs from the same source as freedom of expression: a liberty that enhances individual life in a democratic community. 618.2. Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann in their opinion in Naomi Campbell case[Campbell v. MGN Ltd., (2004) 2 AC 457 : (2004) 2 WLR 1232 : (2004) UKHL 22 (HL)] recognised the importance of the protection of privacy. Lord Hoffman opined as under: (AC p. 472 H & 473 A-D, paras 50-51) 50. What human rights law has done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity. And this recognition has raised inescapably the question of why it should be worth protecting against the state but not against a private person. There may of course be justifications for the publication of private information by private persons which would not be available to the state I have particularly in mind the position of the media, to which I shall return in a moment but I can see no logical ground for saying that a person should have less protection against a private individual than he would have against the state for the publication of personal information for which there is no justification. Nor, it appears, have any of the other Judges who have considered the matter. 51. The result of these developments has been a shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used as a remedy for the unjustified publication of personal information. Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity the right to control the dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people. 618.3. Lord Nicholls opined as under: (Naomi Campbell case Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ 70