(a) there are grounds to believe that (i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and (b) the harm likely to have been or to be suffered by the respondent as a result of the applicant’s expression is serious enough that the public interest in continuing the proceeding outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [51] Section 4 is nearly identical to the pretrial screening mechanism established by subss. (3) and (4) of s. 137.1. The core feature of both laws is the recognition that even claims with substantial merit will be dismissed where the public interest in preserving free debate outweighs the harm to the plaintiff that the litigation purports to address. In this way, anti-SLAPP legislation instructs judges to deny claimants a day in court on a meritorious claim, given a more compelling social goal (Pointes, at para. 62). [52] Given the substantial similarity between the Ontario and British Columbia laws, this Court’s interpretation of s. 137.1 in Pointes and Bent applies with equal force to s. 4 of the PPPA. [53] A s. 4 application first requires the applicant (the defendant) to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeding arises from expression that relates to a matter of public interest (s. 4(1); see Pointes, at paras. 18 and 31). If the defendant does so, the onus shifts to the respondent (the plaintiff) under s. 4(2) to satisfy the court there are grounds to believe that: (1) the proceeding has substantial merit (s. 4(2)(a)(i)), and (2) the defences raised by the defendant are not valid, in that they can be said to have 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) (ii) the applicant has no valid defence in the proceeding, and