MADLANGA J autonomy-protecting features is important to determining whether it has the requisite degree of independence”.122 [88] Admittedly, many of this Court’s judgments regarding independence deal with inspectorates and other institutions, and not with the independence of Judges. One case where focus was on judicial officers is Van Rooyen where Chaskalson CJ said: “In De Lange v Smuts N.O. and Others, Ackermann J referred to the views of the Canadian Supreme Court in The Queen in Right of Canada v Beauregard, Valente v The Queen and R v Généreux on the question of what constitutes an independent and impartial court, describing them as being ‘instructive’. In this context, he mentioned the following summary of the essence of judicial independence given by Dickson CJC in Beauregard’s case: ‘Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them; no outsider – be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge – should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision. This core continues to be central to the principle of judicial independence.’ This requires judicial officers to act independently and impartially in dealing with cases that come before them, and at an institutional level it requires structures to protect courts and judicial officers against external interference.”123 [89] It is generally expected and accepted that Judges act independently, impartially and fairly, without bias or prejudice.124 This is supported by the burdensome onus on 122 Id at para 207. Addressing the Cape Law Society Chaskalson CJ noted that: “Judicial independence is a requirement demanded by the Constitution, not in the personal interests of the Judiciary, but in the public interest, for without that protection judges may not be, or be seen by the public to be, able to perform their duties without fear or favour. This is necessary in the best of times, and crucial at times of stress.” (Justice Chaskalson on the future of the profession at the Cape Law Society AGM [2013] De Rebus 10). 123 S v Van Rooyen (General Council of the Bar of South Africa Intervening) [2002] ZACC 8; 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 8210 (CC) at para 19. 124 According to Cowen SC, the express requirements of the Constitution allow for the identification of five qualities relating to fitness and propriety for judicial office: independence, impartiality, integrity, judicial 50