MADLANGA J direction. That means it is not obligatory for the director to prescribe that the actual application, direction and data unearthed by the surveillance must be kept in terms of section 37. That is so because “particulars of an application”, “particulars of a direction” or “particulars of the result” are not the same as an application, direction or result. If the object of the section was to refer to an application, direction or result, it is oddly convoluted to say “particulars relating to applications, directions or results”. [103] To the extent that section 35(1)(f) provides that the information in respect of which the director must prescribe “must include” what the section specifies, that means what is prescribed may be more than that.143 That does not assist the Minister. It cannot be left to the director to make a choice on so important an issue. That choice effectively leaves it to chance whether a director may prescribe that the information that must be kept must include actual applications, directions and results. This to me seems to be the most important information that a subject of surveillance would have an interest in. That is the type of information that would help her or him make an informed decision whether to litigate for the vindication of rights. Plainly, the threat of litigation has the potential of limiting abuse and, concomitantly, the intrusion into the privacy of individuals. Now whether this important information will be part of what is prescribed to be kept is left to the unbounded discretion of the director. That simply cannot be. There needs to be clear parameters on the exercise of discretion.144 [104] Section 35(1)(g) provides that the director must prescribe the manner in, and the period for, which the information referred to in section 35(1)(f) must be kept. Section 35(1)(g) is thus of no assistance because it refers us back to section 35(1)(f). So, whatever it says is also tainted by whatever shortcomings section 35(1)(f) has. 143 See Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC) at para 455. 144 Compare Dawood above n 49 at para 47 which tells us – in a different context – that— “if broad discretionary powers contain no express constraints, those who are affected by the exercise of the broad discretionary powers will not know what is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they are entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision.” 57