03/02/2020 Slater v Blomfield [2014] NZHC 2221; [2014] 3 NZLR 835 (12 September 2014) powers which are capable of being abused to the detriment of the individual. The recognition of an immunity from disclosure of sources of information would enable irresponsible persons to shelter behind anonymous, or even fictitious, sources. [102] I set out later my reasons for determining that there is public interest in the disclosure of Mr Slater’s sources.49 Mr Blomfield has given notice under s 39 of the Defamation Act to Mr Slater, alleging that Messrs Spring, Powell and Price and 46. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco, above n 45, at 6, relying on McGuinness v Attorney- General (Vic) [1940] HCA 6; [1940] 63 CLR 73 at 102–4, and British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd, above n 6, at 1169–70 and 1179–81. 47 48 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco, above n 45, at 353. At 355. 49 At [112]–[119]. Ms Easterbrook have constructed a planned attack on him. In relation to the just determination of the issues in the case it would be unjust for Mr Blomfield to have to respond to the defence of honest opinion without knowing the source(s) of the vilifying statements. The extreme nature of the attack on Mr Blomfield and the allegation of a planned attack involving sources are relevant, as is the fact that Mr Slater used confidential information belonging to Mr Blomfield. [103] Therefore, the interrogatories seeking disclosure of the sources are necessary in the interests of justice, and the protection provided by r 8.46 cannot be invoked by Mr Slater. It follows that for different reasons, I agree with Judge Blackie’s decision that r 8.46 does not apply. In this respect the appeal is unsuccessful. Application for order that s 68(1) not apply [104] By consent, Mr Blomfield has made an application under s 68(2) of the Evidence Act to this Court that an order be made that s 68(1) not apply. Sections 68(2) and (3) provide: 68 Protection of journalists’ sources ... (2) A Judge of the High Court may order that subsection (1) is not to apply if satisfied by a party to a civil or criminal proceeding that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant outweighs— (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts. (3) The Judge may make the order subject to any terms and conditions that the Judge thinks appropriate. [105] This aspect of the section was considered in detail by Randerson J in Police v 50 Campbell. The onus to satisfy the Court that an order under s 68(2) should be www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/2221.html 22/30