115 indiscriminate conduits. Providers that may opt to exercise editorial discretion—for instance, by offering access only to a limited segment of websites specifically catered to certain content—would not offer a standardized service that can reach “substantially all” endpoints. The rules therefore would not apply to such providers, as the FCC has affirmed. See FCC Br. 81, 146 n.53. With standard broadband internet access, by contrast, there is no editorial limitation on users’ access to lawful internet content. As a result, when a subscriber uses her broadband service to access internet content of her own choosing, she does not understand the accessed content to reflect her broadband provider’s editorial judgment or viewpoint. If it were otherwise—if the accessed content were somehow imputed to the broadband provider—the provider would have First Amendment interests more centrally at stake. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. at 63–65; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 86–88 (1980). But nothing about affording indiscriminate access to internet content suggests that the broadband provider agrees with the content an end user happens to access. Because a broadband provider does not— and is not understood by users to—“speak” when providing neutral access to internet content as common carriage, the First Amendment poses no bar to the open internet rules. VIII. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitions for review. So ordered.