32 In fact, as we’ll see, the Commission’s hypothesis that paid prioritization has deleterious effects seems not to rest on any evidence or analysis. Further, the Order fails to address critiques and alternatives. I look first to the support offered by the Commission for its claim. The Order asserts that “[t]he Commission’s conclusion [that allowance of paid prioritization would disadvantage certain types of edge providers] is supported by a well-established body of economic literature, including Commission staff working papers.” Order ¶ 126. This claim is, to put it simply, false. The Commission points to four economics articles, none of which supports the conclusion that all distinctions in rates, even when based on differentials in service, will reduce the aggregate welfare afforded by a set of economic transactions.4 Indeed, the Commission plainly didn’t look at the articles. None of them even addresses price distinctions calibrated to variations in quality of service; rather they are devoted to the sort of price differences addressed by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, targeting sellers who sell the same good of the same quality at different prices. Three say that in some circumstances rules against price differentials can be beneficial (to repeat, the articles speak of rules against differentials not related to 4 Michael L. Katz, Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1453, 1453-71 (1984) (“Price Discrimination”); Michael L. Katz, Non-Uniform Pricing, Output and Welfare under Monopoly, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 37, 37-56 (1983) (“Output and Welfare”); Michael L. Katz, The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 154, 154-167 (1987); Yoshihiro Yoshida, Third Degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Output and Welfare, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240-246 (2000) (“Third Degree Price Discrimination”).