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The Commission does point to episodes supposedly
supporting its view that paid prioritization constitutes a
significant threat. Order ¶ 69, 79 n.123. It is, however,
merely pointing to a handful of episodes among the large
number of transactions conducted by many broadband
providers. Furthermore, neither in this Order nor in the 2010
Broadband Order, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. at 17915-26, ¶¶ 20-37, cited
by this Order as support, Order ¶ 79 n.123, does the
Commission sift through the evidence to show that any
episode impaired the ability of the internet to maximize
consumer satisfaction and the flourishing of edge providers in
the aggregate, as opposed to harm to a particular edge
provider. Nor does it show whether, if there was harm, a far
narrower rule would not have handled the problem. (For
example, if a broadband provider throttled an edge provider’s
content at the same time as the broadband provider provided
similar content, then—assuming no justification—grounds for
action against such behavior could be discerned. Compare
§ 616(a)(3) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 536(a)(3).) In his dissent to the Order, Commissioner Pai,
using terms perhaps feistier than would suit a court,
summarized it as follows:
The evidence of these continuing threats? There is
none; it’s all anecdote, hypothesis, and hysteria. A small
ISP in North Carolina allegedly blocked VoIP calls a
decade ago. Comcast capped BitTorrent traffic to ease
upload congestion eight years ago. Apple introduced
FaceTime over Wi-Fi first, cellular networks later.
Examples this picayune and stale aren’t enough to tell a
coherent story about net neutrality. The bogeyman never
had it so easy.
Pai Dissent at 333. And Judge Silberman’s observations
about the episodes marshalled to support the precursor order
vacated in Verizon seem as applicable today as then:
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