33 quality of service), not that they are beneficial.5 The fourth paper, still within the sphere of non-quality-related price distinctions, is still worse for the Commission, concluding that “a flat ban” on price discrimination (even assuming no differential in cost and quality, unlike the Commission rule) “could have adverse welfare consequences,” and that “the analysis does not reveal whether there is any implementable form of regulation that would be welfare-improving.” Katz, The Welfare Effects, at 165. It is probably no coincidence that the author of three of these articles, Michael Katz, a former chief economist at the Commission, filed a declaration in this proceeding opposing the type of regulation adopted in the Order as overly broad, especially given that the behavior banned was at most responsible for only hypothetical harms. Protecting and Promoting Consumer Benefits Derived from the internet: Declaration of Michael L. Katz, July 15, 2014 (“Katz Declaration”), at 2-3. I will discuss his critique and the alternatives he offers shortly. The Order also points to two old Commission reports that it claims support its argument. Order ¶ 126 n.297. They do not. One, Jay M. Atkinson & Christopher C. Barnekov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to Network Interconnection, OPP Working Paper Series, No. 34, at 15 (2000), deals with network interconnection pricing and advocates a “bill and 5 Katz, Price Discrimination, at 1454 (“uniform pricing is more efficient than price discrimination when the number of uninformed consumers is small”); Katz, Output and Welfare, at 37 (“there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation” of price discrimination); Yoshida, Third Degree Price Discrimination, at 244 (“[i]n general, we cannot expect” the condition required for regulation to improve welfare to be true).