37 also argue that Congress’s grants to the Commission of “narrow authority over circumscribed aspects of the Internet” indicate that the Commission lacks “the authority it claims here.” Members of Congress for Pet’rs Amicus Br. 9. None of the statutes amici cite, however, have anything to do with the sort of common carrier regulations at issue here. Full Service Network also urges us to resolve this case at Chevron step one, though it takes the opposite position of US Telecom. According to Full Service Network, broadband is unambiguously a telecommunications service because it functions primarily as a transmission service. That argument clearly fails in light of Brand X, which held that classification of broadband as an information service was permissible. Brand X also requires that we reject intervenor TechFreedom’s argument that the reclassification issue is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). In that case, the Court held that “Congress ha[d] clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.” Id. at 126. The Court emphasized that the FDA had disclaimed any authority to regulate tobacco products for more than eighty years and that Congress had repeatedly legislated against this background. Id. at 143–59. Furthermore, the Court observed, if the FDA did have authority to regulate the tobacco industry, given its statutory obligations and its factual findings regarding the harmful effects of tobacco, the FDA would have had to ban tobacco products, a result clearly contrary to congressional intent. See id. at 135–43. If Congress sought to “delegate a decision of such economic and political significance” to the agency, the Court noted, it would have done so clearly. Id. at 160. Relying on Brown & Williamson, TechFreedom urges us to