Page: 5 [20] In my view, the heart of this issue is a jurisdictional question - whether the Act has any application at all to the documents in question. Moreover, this is a legal question of broad significance for thousands of individuals across the province, going well beyond the interests of the particular parties before the court. This is a question of law that attracts the correctness standard, as has been determined in Walmsley and, more recently, Ministry of the Attorney-General v. Toronto Star. F. ANALYSIS What is the purpose and intent of the legislation? [21] Although the Arbitrator recognized that the correct legal approach in determining the meaning of “custody or control” must be a purposive one, she did not actually take a purposive approach to the issue before her. Indeed, apart from merely stating the principle, she gave no consideration to the intent and purpose of the legislation as part of her analysis in determining what “custody or control” means in relation to the subject documents. This, in my view, is a fundamental legal error. [22] The act itself contains no definition of the words “custody” or “control,” which makes context and legislative intention even more important. As a starting point, it is worth noting that the modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”9 (Emphasis added) [23] The first indication of legislative purpose (as it relates to this case) is within the Act itself, and in particular in s. 1(a) which states: The purposes of this Act are, (a) to provide a right of access to information under the control of institutions in accordance with the principles that, (i) information should be available to the public, (ii) necessary exemptions from the right of access should be limited and specific, and (iii) decisions on the disclosure of information should be reviewed independently of the institution controlling the information; [24] Although this provision emphasizes the broad importance of access to information and requires that exemptions to that access be circumscribed, it does not provide much information about 9 Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at para. 26, citing with approval Driedger’s Construction of Statutes (2nd ed., 1983 at p. 87)