16 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC Opinion of the Court of programming) is itself expressive, and intrusion into that activity must be specially justified under the First Amendment. The capstone of those precedents came in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995), when the Court considered (of all things) a parade. The question was whether Massachusetts could require the organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade to admit as a participant a gay and lesbian group seeking to convey a message of “pride.” Id., at 561. The Court held unanimously that the First Amendment precluded that compulsion. The “selection of contingents to make a parade,” it explained, is entitled to First Amendment protection, no less than a newspaper’s “presentation of an edited compilation of [other persons’] speech.” Id., at 570 (citing Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 258). And that meant the State could not tell the parade organizers whom to include. Because “every participating unit affects the message,” said the Court, ordering the group’s admittance would “alter the expressive content of the[ ] parade.” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572– 573. The parade’s organizers had “decided to exclude a message [they] did not like from the communication [they] chose to make,” and that was their decision alone. Id., at 574. On two other occasions, the Court distinguished Tornillo and its progeny for the flip-side reason—because in those cases the compelled access did not affect the complaining party’s own expression. First, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), the Court rejected a shopping mall’s First Amendment challenge to a California law requiring it to allow members of the public to distribute handbills on its property. The mall owner did not claim that he (or the mall) was engaged in any expressive activity. Indeed, as the PG&E Court later noted, he “did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets” passed out at the mall. 475 U. S., at 12. Similarly, in