Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 29 Opinion of the Court The case here is no different. The interest Texas asserts is in changing the balance of speech on the major platforms’ feeds, so that messages now excluded will be included. To describe that interest, the State borrows language from this Court’s First Amendment cases, maintaining that it is preventing “viewpoint discrimination.” Brief for Texas 19; see supra, at 26–27. But the Court uses that language to say what governments cannot do: They cannot prohibit private actors from expressing certain views. When Texas uses that language, it is to say what private actors cannot do: They cannot decide for themselves what views to convey. The innocent-sounding phrase does not redeem the prohibited goal. The reason Texas is regulating the contentmoderation policies that the major platforms use for their feeds is to change the speech that will be displayed there. Texas does not like the way those platforms are selecting and moderating content, and wants them to create a different expressive product, communicating different values and priorities. But under the First Amendment, that is a preference Texas may not impose. —————— no help to speak of. Turner did indeed hold that the FCC’s must-carry provisions, requiring cable operators to give some of their channel space to local broadcast stations, passed First Amendment muster. See supra, at 15. But the interest there advanced was not to balance expressive content; rather, the interest was to save the local-broadcast industry, so that it could continue to serve households without cable. That interest, the Court explained, was “unrelated to the content of expression” disseminated by either cable or broadcast speakers. Turner I, 512 U. S. 622, 647 (1994). And later, the Hurley Court again noted the difference. It understood the Government interest in Turner as one relating to competition policy: The FCC needed to limit the cable operators’ “monopolistic,” gatekeeping position “in order to allow for the survival of broadcasters.” 515 U. S., at 577. Unlike in regulating the parade—or here in regulating Facebook’s News Feed or YouTube’s homepage—the Government’s interest was “not the alteration of speech.” Ibid. And when that is so, the prospects of permissible regulation are entirely different.