Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 17 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment text or history of the First Amendment.” Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S., at 384 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Instead, the Court has supplied only “policy considerations and value judgments.” Ibid. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines’ method of facial invalidation eventually spread to other areas of law, setting in motion our modern facial challenge doctrine. For several decades after Thornhill, the Court continued to resist the broad use of facial challenges. For example, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), the Court emphasized that “[c]onstitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court.” Id., at 611. In that vein, the Court characterized “facial overbreadth adjudication [as] an exception to our traditional rules of practice.” Id., at 615. But, the Court eventually entertained facial challenges more broadly where a plaintiff established that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” 6 Salerno, 481 U. S., at 745. Just as with the overbreadth doctrine, the Court has yet to explain how facial challenges are consistent with the Constitution’s text or history. Given how our facial challenge doctrine seems to have developed—with one doctrinal mistake leading to another—it is no wonder that facial challenges create a host of constitutional and practical issues. See supra, at 6–13. Rather than perpetuate our mistakes, the Court should end them. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional —————— 6 Some Members of the Court subsequently sought to apply a more lenient standard to all facial challenges. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449 (2008) (noting that “some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 472 (2010) (reserving the question of which standard applies to “a typical facial attack”).