Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 29 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment These disclosures suggest that platforms can say something about their content-moderation practices without enabling malicious actors or disclosing proprietary information. They also suggest that not all platforms curate all third-party content in an inherently expressive way. Without more information about how regulated platforms moderate content, it is not possible to determine whether these laws lack “a ‘ “plainly legitimate sweep.” ’ ” Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at 449. For all these reasons, NetChoice failed to establish whether the content-moderation provisions violate the First Amendment on their face. D Although the only question the Court must decide today is whether NetChoice showed that the Florida and Texas laws are facially unconstitutional, much of the majority opinion addresses a different question: whether the Texas law’s content-moderation provisions are constitutional as applied to two features of two platforms—Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homepage. The opinion justifies this discussion on the ground that the Fifth Circuit cannot apply the facial constitutionality test without resolving that question, see, e.g., ante, at 13, 30, but that is not necessarily true. Especially in light of the wide reach of the Texas law, NetChoice may still fall far short of establishing facial unconstitutionality—even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the Texas law is unconstitutional as applied to Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homepage.53 For this reason, the majority’s “guidance” on this issue may well be superfluous. Yet superfluity is not its most egregious flaw. The majority’s discussion also rests on wholly conclusory assumptions that lack record support. —————— 53 This problem is even more pronounced for the Florida law, which covers more platforms and conduct than the Texas law.