48. I turn next to the position of YMA and the children. As explained in para 39 of my previous judgment, the interests of other family members, in particular children, are a significant consideration, but they cannot be a trump card. Paragraph 61 of the redacted judgment (para 63 of the full judgment) referred to the likelihood that, in the absence of an injunction, the children would in the future learn about these matters from school friends or the Internet. That is now a less material consideration. In my view, whether or not the court grants an injunction, it is inevitable that the two children will in due course learn about these matters.” Analysis of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 18 April 2016 (i) HRA section 12 19. There is, as all members of the Supreme Court conclude, a clear error of law in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in relation to section 12. For reasons given in para 20 below, it consists in the self-direction that section 12 “enhances the weight which article 10 rights carry in the balancing exercise” (para 40). The Court of Appeal’s further self-direction, that section 12 “raises the hurdle which the claimant must overcome in order to obtain an interim injunction” is unexceptionable, in so far as section 12 replaces the general American Cyanamid test, focused on the balance of convenience, with a test of whether the appellant is “likely to establish that publication should not be allowed” at trial. The position was stated more particularly by Lord Nicholls said in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44; [2005] 1 AC 253, para 22, in a speech with which the other members of the House agreed: “Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at trial an essential element in the court’s consideration of whether to make an interim order. There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an Page 12