has permitted a plaintiff to bring suit for violations of federal privacy law absent any indication of pecuniary harm.19 The plaintiffs here base their claims on highly specific allegations that the defendants, in the course of serving advertisements to their personal web browsers, implanted tracking cookies on their personal computers. Irrespective of whether these allegations state a claim, the events that the complaint describes are concrete, particularized, and actual as to the plaintiffs. To the extent that the defendants believe that the alleged conduct implicates interests that are not legally protected, this is an issue of the merits rather than of standing. The plaintiffs show injury in fact, and we have jurisdiction to address the merits of their claims.20 18 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 641 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doe has standing to sue, the Court agrees, based on ‘allegations that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” and “greatly concerned and worried” because of the disclosure of his Social Security number and its potentially “devastating” consequences.’”). 20 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It had 15