As the Second Circuit explained in Caro v. Weintraub, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support an inference that the offender intercepted the communication for the purpose of a tortious or criminal act that is independent of the intentional act of recording.”82 And though the plaintiffs may well plead facts that constitute violations of California laws related to intrusion upon seclusion, for purposes of the exception to § 2511(2)(d), “[i]nvasion of privacy through intrusion upon seclusion presents a problem . . . —it is a tort that occurs through the act of interception itself.”83 As the plaintiffs plead no tortious or criminal use of the acquired internet histories, § 2511(2)(d) is not inapplicable on the basis of the criminaltortious purpose exception. Based on the facts alleged in the pleadings, the defendants were parties to any communications that they acquired, such that their conduct is within the § 2511(2)(d) exception.84 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim. B. The Stored Communications Act We next address the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. Enacted in 1986, the Stored Communications Act was born from congressional recognition that neither existing federal statutes 82 Caro, 618 F.3d at 100 (emphasis added). 83 Id. at 101. 84 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 41