— 22 — electronic copy away from his computer. Rather, copies were only created by the downloading activities of the members of the swarm. In other words, there was no distribution since the appellant did not transfer any copy previously in his possession to the downloading swarm. He merely enabled them to make copies of their own. 57. This argument must be rejected on the facts. It is of course true, but not relevant, that the initial infringing copy of each film remained on the appellant’s hard disk. As previously stated, the magistrate accepted the evidence as establishing that electronic copies duplicating that initial infringing copy were generated by the appellant’s computer and were then sent to the downloaders as a stream of digital packets designed to be reconstituted as entire, viewable films. Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of this argument, that Mr Pun’s approach to the meaning of “distribution” is correct – namely, that it requires the transfer of a copy in the distributor’s possession to the recipient – the findings were to the effect that the appellant did create and did have possession of such a copy (transiently or otherwise) for distribution to the downloading swarm. 58. I would expressly leave open the question of construction, that is, whether Mr Pun is right to suggest that “distribution of a copy” necessarily requires the transfer of a copy which was first in the distributor’s possession. Thus, if the evidence had been different and if it had shown that no further electronic copy of any film was ever created by the appellant’s computer and that no such copy was ever transmitted to the downloaders; but that the appellant had enabled the recipients by some technological means to create infringing electronic copies of the three films on their own computers, the question would still arise as to whether such conduct on his part could constitute the “distribution of infringing copies”. The fact would remain that by his use of technology the appellant had caused reproductions of the