- 8- They appealed on the grounds that the computer disc was not a photograph for the purposes of section 1 of the Act of 1978 and therefore the data was not distributed or shown within the meaning of the Act. It was held dismissing the appeal: (1) that the scope of the definition of indecent photographs in sections 1 and 7 of the 1978 Act was wide enough to include a form of technology not anticipated when that act was passed; that although the computer disc was not a photograph, it contained data which could be converted into a screen image and into a print exactly reproducing the original photograph from which it was derived; that there was no restriction on the nature of a copy and the data represented the original photograph in another form and accordingly the judge was correct to rule the disc held data which came within the definition of photograph for the purposes of the 1978 Act. (2) that merely because the recipient obtained an exact reproduction of the photographs contained in the archive in digital form did not mean that the (copy) photographs were not held in the 1st Appellant’s possession with a view to those same photographs being shown to others; the same data was transmitted to the recipient so that he would see the same visual reproduction as was available to the sender. Accordingly, both Appellants were guilty of offences under the 1978 Act. The technology with which the court was concerned in Fellows was similar to that with which the Magistrate was concerned here, because the Obscene Publication Act 1959, as amended 1964, defined both “article” and “publish” in terms which did not provide specifically for the computer technology which was available to the 1st Appellant by 1994. Fellows argued therefore that his computer based activity could not constitute an offence under the 1959 Act.