factor to determine the constitution of a crime, and thus the overextension of the right to punish can be prevented only when strictly restricting the modality of an act. Furthermore, in that the Criminal Act allows even the case where true facts are revealed to be punished for criminal defamation, there is a great need to limit the culpability scope. Taking into account propagation possibility when determining publicity is to confuse both the benefit and protection of the law in criminal defamation, which is abstract endangerment offenses established on the sole basis of the risk of being infringed even if the reputation is not externally infringed in reality, and the modality of an act by substituting propagation possibility for publicity required as the modality of an act of criminal defamation. Viewing the criminal defamation as abstract endangerment offenses is to punish where a person’s reputation is in danger of being infringed by the facts publicly alleged, not even where the alleged facts are at risk for becoming public. This is because the legal basis of punishment of criminal defamation lies with the danger that facts can be constantly disseminated, i.e., not the danger of defamation resulting from propagation by another person but the danger of defamation caused by publicly alleging facts. The Majority Opinion also interprets as a state that many and unspecified persons can recognize, and thus criminal defamation is consummated if many and unspecified person become aware of facts which can defame another. This is to admit criminal defamation by acknowledging illegality prior thereto even if the civil responsibility for unlawful act based on the result of infringement due to defamation is not constituted. However, the theory of propagation possibility recognizes illegality before reaching such a dangerous stage. In other words, it views the possibility of being propagated to many and unspecified person as the same as many and unspecified person being already in such a state. The Majority Opinion viewed the former case as one where a state that many and unspecified persons can recognize is indirectly caused, but a state that many and unspecified persons can recognize cannot be seen to be indirectly caused on the sole basis of an act of alleging facts to a particular minority. Only in the case where the other party thereof actually alleged facts to many and unspecified persons, such danger can be seen to be caused, and the “general” risk such as infringement on another’s reputation cannot be seen to have occurred in the case where the facts are