Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Miranda v SSHD defendants’ case. There is no suggestion that media reporting on terrorism ought per se to be considered equivalent to assisting terrorists. The construction advanced allows as I have said for the ascertainment of the possibility that a traveller at a port may be involved, directly or indirectly, in any of a range of activities enumerated in section 1(2) of the Act. Not least given the requirement that the power must be exercised upon some reasoned basis, proportionately and in good faith, I cannot conclude that any of the international materials relied on points towards a different construction.” 43. Mr Ryder submits that what he calls the literal interpretation of the definition of terrorism advanced by Mr Kovats and accepted by Laws LJ is too broad. It would include activity that is entirely non-violent; is in pursuit of a legitimate and mainstream political cause; may “endanger life” by accident; and where the person may be “concerned” in such activity wholly accidentally or even without knowledge. This broad interpretation of section 1 also affects the interpretation of other provisions of TACT. For example, section 41 gives a constable the power to arrest, without a warrant, any person “whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist”. On this interpretation of “act of terrorism”, section 41 would allow a power of arrest, detention and questioning of any person on reasonable grounds to suspect that he was accidentally or unknowingly involved in non-violent political activity that indirectly, inadvertently and unintentionally happened to endanger life. 44. Mr Ryder accepts that the literal interpretation is a possible interpretation. But he submits that there is an alternative preferable interpretation which he set out in a note dated 18 November 2015 as follows: “[I]t is what the action ‘involves’, or what its consequence ‘creates’ etc, and not merely the action itself, which must be used or threatened for political ends. Thus it would constitute terrorism to use or threaten serious violence or the creation of a serious risk to health and safety in order to influence the Government and to advance a political or religious cause. If, however, an individual was unaware that his actions created a serious risk to health and safety, those actions could not be said to be ‘the use or threat’ of such a risk for the purpose of advancing a political cause and influencing the Government.” 45. Mr Ryder relies on paras 4.14 to 4.21 of the July 2015 report of Mr Anderson which expresses concerns about the apparent breadth of the literal interpretation. At para 4.19, Mr Anderson instances the publication of a blog or an article that argues (on religious or political grounds) against the vaccination of children for certain diseases. Mr Anderson points out that, on this interpretation, if the publication were judged to create a serious risk to public health, and if it was designed to influence government policy, it would be classified as a terrorist action. 46. Mr Ryder gave another example: a group of junior doctors wishes to erect a sign to protest about Government policy towards the NHS. Inadvertently, some members of the group erect it in a way that accidentally endangers the life of a passer-by. Mr Ryder submits that, if the literal interpretation of “act of terrorism” adopted by Laws