Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Miranda v SSHD purpose of the examination would be to assist in making a CPI determination about Mr MIRANDA” (para 13). 16. At 17.19 on Saturday 17 August, a final PCS was delivered to the police from the Security Service. It had some text in common with earlier versions (“Intelligence indicates... ports stop against MIRANDA”), but also the following: “We assess that MIRANDA is knowingly carrying material, the release of which would endanger people’s lives. Additionally the disclosure, or threat of disclosure, is designed to influence a government, and is made for the purpose of promoting a political or ideological cause. This therefore falls within the definition of terrorism and as such we request that the subject is examined under Schedule 7.” 17. On his own account DI Woodford did not see the final PCS on the Saturday, but was told what it contained over the telephone. Accordingly he “indicated that [he] was satisfied that the use of Schedule 7 was appropriate” (para 14). Meanwhile, at about 17.30 that day another officer, DS Bird, head of the Ports Team, told Det Supt Stokley that following “dialogue” between the Security Service and the Ports Team, he (DS Bird) “was now satisfied that there was a justification for the Schedule 7 stop”. Det Supt Stokley was given to understand that this was reflected in the PCS, which however he did not see (“it is not my role to approve them”: see para 38 of his second witness statement dated 30 October 2013). 18. DI Woodford saw the final PCS early in the morning of Sunday 18 August at Heathrow. He satisfied himself that “sufficient information had been provided to allow a lawful Schedule 7 examination to take place”. In particular, he considered that “there was now confirmation that the examination would assist in making a CPI determination” (para 15 of his witness statement). He “did not know at the time what ‘the material’ referred to in the PCS consisted of” (para 16). But he said at para 19: “With regard to the PCS forms, if I had not been satisfied that the MPS would be acting lawfully in undertaking Schedule 7 stop based on the information received, I would not have agreed to the examination. PCS forms are used to pass on information to police where there is concern about a risk from terrorism, and as I have mentioned earlier in this witness statement, in this case the PCS was completed by the Security Service. Where appropriate the MPS then acts in compliance with the police’s duty to protect the public. The power remains a police power and the police have to be satisfied that it is an appropriate and lawful use of the power. Once we receive sufficient assurances from appropriate agencies that the purpose of the examination is to assist in making a determination about whether the person appears to be someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, there is an expectation that CT police officers will use all available powers in support of the UK’s CT effort where it is appropriate to do so.” 19. It was in these circumstances that the Schedule 7 stop went ahead, as I have said, at 08.05 on 18 August. It was executed by two SO 15 officers, PC 206005 and PC