-32was accepted by the Faulks Committee in the United Kingdom and by the Australian Law Reform Commission. The logic is irresistible so long as the printer qualifies as a subordinate publisher ...” K.2 81. Knowledge of what? What must the publisher be shown to have known or to be expected to have known in order to be treated as a first or main publisher and so deprived of the defence? Mr Thomas submitted that it was sufficient that these respondents knew that they were hosting and making accessible a multitude of postings on the forum. They must therefore, he argued, be taken to know the content of the postings or discussion threads complained of since they formed part of that multitudinous body of material. I cannot accept such a broad and indiscriminate basis for deeming an internet intermediary strictly liable as a first or main publisher. It should be stressed that adopting a more focussed requirement as to knowledge does not mean absolving a platform provider from liability. It means treating it as a subordinate publisher and throwing on it the burden of bringing itself within the innocent dissemination defence. 82. Eady J in Bunt v Tilley, 66 helpfully explains the nature of the knowledge requirement in the following terms: “I have little doubt ... that to impose legal responsibility upon anyone under the common law for the publication of words it is essential to demonstrate a degree of awareness or at least an assumption of general responsibility, such as has long been recognised in the context of editorial responsibility. As Lord Morris commented in McLeod v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549 , 562: ‘A printer and publisher intends to publish, and so intending cannot plead as a justification that he did not know the contents. The appellant in this case never intended to publish.’ In that case the relevant publication consisted in handing over an unread copy of a newspaper for return the following day. It was held that there was no sufficient degree of awareness or intention to impose legal responsibility for that ‘publication’. ... for a person to be held responsible there must be knowing involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words.” (Italics in the original) 83. In Emmens v Pottle, in summarising the situation which gave rise to the innocent dissemination defence, Lord Esher MR stated: “...the defendants 66 [2007] 1 WLR 1243 at §§22-23.