argument entirely disregards the victim’s first amendment right to engage in a personal and private communication that includes a private sexual image. Defendant’s crude attempt to “blame the victim” is not well received and reinforces the need for criminalization. Accordingly, defendant has not established that, on balance, the social costs weigh in her favor or that the marginal restraint on constitutionally protected speech is greater than necessary to advance the governmental interest at stake. ¶ 110 F. Constitutional Vagueness ¶ 111 Defendant also argues that section 11-23.5(b) is unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of her right to due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). The argument that a statute is void for vagueness is premised on the notice requirement of the due process clause. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 21. A statute may be challenged as vague on either of two grounds: (1) it fails to give fair warning to allow innocent people to steer clear of its prohibitions, or (2) it contains insufficiently clear standards for those who enforce it and may lead to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 21. In addition, where a statute involves first amendment rights, it should not be so vague that it chills the exercise of free expression by generating concern over whether such conduct may violate the statute’s prohibition. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 22. Therefore, “when a statute ‘interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.’ ” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 19 (2010) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)); Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 22. However, “ ‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’ ” Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 794). ¶ 112 A vagueness claim based on due process is analytically distinct from a first amendment overbreadth claim and does not depend upon whether a law applies to a substantial amount of protected speech. Holder, 561 U.S. at 19-20. A facial challenge to a statute that is premised on due process vagueness grounds can succeed “only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A - 35 -