disclosure would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.” VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, ¶ 60. ¶ 131 Here, however, section 11-23.5 is not narrowly tailored, and its broad reach could include a wide swath of conduct, including innocent conduct. Unlike the Vermont statute’s requirement that the defendant intend “to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted,” section 11-23.5 offers no such “rigorous intent element.” See 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b) (West 2016). Instead, simply viewing an image sent in a text message and showing it to the person next to you could result in felony charges. Because of the specific intent element, the majority in VanBuren stated “[i]ndividuals are highly unlikely to accidentally violate this statute while engaging in otherwise permitted speech.” VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, ¶ 62. The same cannot be said of individuals in Illinois under this statute. ¶ 132 The majority contends that “although a malicious purpose is not expressly mandated, the breadth of section 11-23.5(b) is effectively limited by the five elements and conditions that define the prohibited conduct.” Supra ¶ 105. I disagree. The elements and conditions do not limit the breadth of the statute at all but instead reach an expansive amount of conduct. Unlike those states that specifically require an intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, coerce, embarrass, frighten, terrify, torment, terrorize, degrade, demean, annoy, alarm, or abuse the victim, the Illinois statute requires nothing of the sort. Although the majority finds the statute “implicitly includes an illicit motive or malicious purpose” (supra ¶ 106), the absence of any such nefarious intentions proscribed by other states opens the door wide for innocent conduct to be criminalized. The legislature’s failure to include any one of the above stated terms belies the majority’s claims that “the inclusion of an explicit motive to cause harm would not appreciably narrow its scope.” Supra ¶ 106. ¶ 133 The Vermont statute also limited a violation to when the disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm, and it defines “harm” as “physical injury, financial injury, or serious emotional distress.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2606(a)(2) (2015). Under the Illinois law, there is no objective or subjective harm requirement. Cf. Cal. Penal Code § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2019) (requiring the victim to suffer “serious emotional distress”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189c(a) (2015) (requiring the victim to suffer harm as a result of the dissemination); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17- - 41 -