¶ 34 The United States Supreme Court has rejected a free-floating test for first amendment coverage that balances the relative social costs and benefits on an ad hoc basis. Rather, the Supreme Court has permitted content-based restrictions where confined to the few historic, traditional, and long-familiar categories of expression. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468, 470. The Supreme Court has observed: “Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. However, the above-listed categories of unprotected speech “have a historical foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718. ¶ 35 In this case, the circuit court found that the targeted speech did not fit into any categorical first amendment exception. Before this court, the State argues that “state laws protecting individual privacy rights have long been established.” According to the State, “history supports the conclusion that States may regulate speech that invades privacy without violating the First Amendment.” ¶ 36 We decline the State’s invitation to identify a new category of speech that falls outside of first amendment protection. The nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, prohibited by section 11-23.5(b) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b) (West 2016)), does not fall within an established first amendment categorical exception. We acknowledge, as did the Vermont Supreme Court, that the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images “seems to be a strong candidate for categorical exclusion from full First Amendment protections” based on “[t]he broad development across the country of invasion of privacy torts, and the longstanding historical pedigree of laws protecting the privacy of nonpublic figures with respect to matters of only private interest without any established First Amendment limitations.” State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, ¶ 43. However, we decline to identify a new categorical first amendment exception when the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question. See id. ¶ 46. Nevertheless, the consideration of individual privacy that would support the articulation of a first amendment categorical exclusion in this case will carry weight later in our analysis. ¶ 37 Thus far, we have concluded that section 11-23.5(b) implicates the freedom of speech and that the targeted speech does not fit into any first amendment categorical exception. Therefore, first amendment scrutiny is warranted. We must next - 11 -