03/02/2020 2016 BCSC 686 Pritchard v. Van Nes [128] Hill described some factors that may be taken into account in assessing aggravation: 191 … For example, was there a withdrawal of the libellous statement made by the defendants and an apology tendered? If there was, this may go far to establishing that there was no malicious conduct on the part of the defendant warranting an award of aggravated damages. The jury may also consider whether there was a repetition of the libel, conduct that was calculated to deter the plaintiff from proceeding with the libel action, a prolonged and hostile cross-examination of the plaintiff or a plea of justification which the defendant knew was bound to fail. The general manner in which the defendant presented its case is also relevant. Further, it is appropriate for a jury to consider the conduct of the defendant at the time of the publication of the libel. For example, was it clearly aimed at obtaining the widest possible publicity in circumstances that were the most adverse possible to the plaintiff? [129] There has been no examination of discovery of the defendant, and so I have no admissions from her as to what prompted to act in the manner she did, nor as to the basis for the statements she made in her posts. This leaves me with the task of trying to infer malice from the extrinsic or intrinsic features of this case. [130] Mr. Pritchard perceives the defendant’s initial posts, and then the escalation that occurred as she encouraged comments with remarks like, “Oh Robert you make me laugh man”, as an orchestrated campaign to malign his character and publically humiliate him. His perception is entirely understandable. But the impression I have of the defendant through her posts is of someone who was childish and shallow, and I do not credit her with that degree of forethought. [131] I do not find that the claim of malice has been made out. Taken in its entirety, the evidence of the defendant’s actions – her self-centred, unneighbourly conduct; her failure to respond reasonably to the plaintiff’s various complaints, particularly regarding her dog; and her thoughtless Facebook posts – point just as much to narcissism as to animosity. Her belief that the decorative mirror hung on the exterior of the plaintiff’s house was some sort of surveillance device was simply ridiculous, speaking, to be blunt, more of stupidity than malice. [132] The defendant, as I see it, appears to have thoughtlessly taken to a social medium to give vent to her feelings, making reckless statements without any regard to the consequences. She certainly ought to have anticipated the potential impact of her remarks; whether she actually did so has not been proven. [133] The defendant’s subsequent actions bear none of the indicia of malice discussed at para. 191 of Hill: she removed the posts relatively quickly, probably when the gravity of the situation became apparent to her through the police presence at the plaintiff’s home; she did not seek to publicize the proceedings, giving rise to further dissemination of the defamation; she did not file a defence. [134] Aggravated damages are not in order, but given the seriousness of the allegations and the extent of the harm suffered, a significant award of general damages is. I award the plaintiff general damages for defamation of $50,000. [135] I further find this an appropriate case for an award of punitive damages, as a means of rebuking the plaintiff for her thoughtless, reckless behaviour. She acted without any consideration for the devastating nature of her remarks. With regard to the factors enunciated by the Supreme https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/16/06/2016BCSC0686.htm 25/26