05/02/2020 2016 ONCJ 35 (CanLII) | CanLII I find, based on her testimony, that this is the fear that she was expressing to Twitter in her email complaint of September 11, 2012, when she wrote: “Additionally I am part of a ladies group that meets Mondays, and he is ‘tweet eavesdropping/stalking’ this group, which also leads many of us to be concerned for our safety in real life, as this has now begun to feel like a real life threat.” This comment was based on the tweet from Mr. Elliott regarding the Cadillac Lounge meeting. After the Cadillac Lounge incident and her complaint to Twitter, Ms. Reilly continued to engage with Mr. Elliott. She retweeted tweets that mocked him about being afraid to walk the streets after dark, about people trying to help him but his ego “fucking it up” and telling him to stop using #TBTB to spew his “self-aggrandizing, misogynistic bullshit”. She retweeted tweets accusing him of “working on” teenage girls, of not updating his profile because he was afraid it would hurt his “mack”, of “creeping” on 13-year-olds. One, not a retweet, referred to the “twisted shit” that he wrote. All this occurred before the police became involved with Ms. Guthrie. As Ms. Guthrie testified, there is no such thing as a perfect victim. But Ms. Reilly’s retweeting of forceful, insulting, unconfirmed and ultimately inaccurate attacks suggesting pedophilia – combined with her tentative, hypothetical concerns that he could possibly move from online to offline harassment, and her knowledge that he never came to the Cadillac Lounge and never again referred to her whereabouts – raises doubt in my mind to whether she was afraid of Mr. Elliott. There is no suggestion of fear in her communication. Fear can be of psychological harm, as Crown counsel submits, but that is not the fear that Ms. Reilly was expressing to Twitter or in her testimony. Reasonable doubt is a high standard. As Justice Cory stated in R. v. Lifchus, “a jury which concludes only that the accused is probably guilty must acquit.”[31] This directive applies to every element of this charge, including that Mr. Elliott’s repeated communications caused Ms. Reilly to fear for her safety. Even if I had found that the two minutes of concern at the Cadillac Lounge amounted to fear for her safety, I would not find it to be reasonable in all of the circumstances. Ms. Reilly wrote to Twitter that Mr. Elliott stalked her and eavesdropped on Twitter. She also tweeted to him on September 11, right after the Cadillac Lounge incident: “Making this request again publicly-stop reading my feed and alluding to it with your tweets.” Her fear that he might have been at the Cadillac Lounge and that he could escalate to offline and real-life harassment (though she had no idea what he would do) is based on her view that there is privacy in Twitter and that one account holder can dictate what another account holder tweets. But on the whole of this evidence, relating to both her and Ms. Guthrie, Twitter is not private, by definition and in its essence. On this evidentiary record, asking a person to stop reading one’s feed from a freely chosen open account is not reasonable. Nor is it reasonable to ask someone to stop alluding to one’s tweets. To subscribe to Twitter and keep your account open is to waive your right to privacy in your tweets. Arranging a meeting or social event using tweets other than direct messages is like inviting strangers into your home or onto your phone line while you talk to your friends. Blocking only goes so far, as long as you choose to remain open. I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Elliott’s repeated communications caused Ms. Reilly to fear for her safety. But had I been so satisfied in relation to the Cadillac Lounge incident, I would not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such fear, based as it was on an expectation that nondirect tweets are private, was reasonable in all of the circumstances. The charge relating to Ms. Reilly is also dismissed. CONCLUSION The charges are dismissed. There is evidence of Mr. Elliott not keeping the peace in the general sense of swearing and using sexual and sexist language inappropriately. But Crown counsel fairly stated at the outset that the alleged breach of his peace bond was the commission of the other two offences. Since he is not guilty of those, the charge of failing to comply with his peace bond is also dismissed.       ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/R v Gregory Allan Elliott.htm 42/43