05/02/2020 2016 ONCJ 35 (CanLII) | CanLII Goudge in Kosikar accepts that the complainant must be in a state of being harassed as a consequence of the prohibited contact. Further, judicial interpretation of the section establishes that the defendant must be responsible for the harassment that the complainant is experiencing. At paragraphs 15 and 16 of Lamontagne, Justice Proulx states as follows:[6] Ce deuxième élément de l'actus reus, à savoir que la plaignante soit harcelée, ressort plus clairement de la version anglaise du texte qui exige la connaissance que la plaignante "is harassed", alors que la version française réfère à la connaissance que la plaignante "se sente harcelée". Dans l'arrêt R. v. Ryback (1996), 1996 CanLII 1833 (BC CA), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 240, la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique a aussi interprété l'art. 264 comme exigeant la preuve de la connaissance par l'accusé que la plaignante a été de fait harcelée, concluant que le premier juge n'avait pas erré "in finding that appellant knowingly or recklessly harassed the complainant". (Rybak as spelled in original) D'ailleurs, quand dans la version française il est stipulé que la connaissance ou l'insouciance que la plaignante se sente harcelée cela implique que l'auteur, par son fait, a contribué au harcèlement de la plaignante puisqu'on pourrait difficilement lui imputer une connaissance d'un état dont il n'est pas responsable. English version from 1998 CanLII 13048 (QC CA), 129 C.C.C.(3d)181: The second element of the actus reus, that is the complainant was harassed, appears even more clear in the English version of the text which requires knowledge that the victim “is harassed”, whereas the French version refers to knowledge that the complainant “feels harassed”. In R. v. Ryback (1996), 1996 CanLII 1833 (BC CA), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 240, the British Colombia Court of Appeal also interpreted s. 264 as requiring proof of the accused’s knowledge that the complainant was in fact harassed, concluding that the trial judge had not erred “in finding appellant knowingly or recklessly harassed the complainant”. Furthermore, when in the French version it is stipulated that there be knowledge or recklessness that the complainant feels harassed, that implies that the perpetrator, by his own act, contributed to the harassment of the complainant because one can hardly impute to him knowledge of a state of being which he is not the cause of. (Emphasis only in English translation) I rely on the original as well as the translation because in my opinion it is arguable whether or not the apparently unofficial English version fully conveys Justice Proulx’s “on pourrait difficilement lui imputer une connaissance d’un état dont il n’est pas responsable.” Also, the translation has emphasis that does not appear in the online original. Knowledge Knowledge means actual knowledge; as the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Zundel,[7] the accused must know. A specific state of mind is specified in this section, which does not admit of anything less than knowledge, or recklessness as contemplated by the section and the form of charge in the Criminal Code. Don Stuart argues[8] that Zundel is wrong and that the ruling is moot because the Supreme Court declared the section in question unconstitutional. But I hold, following the reasoning in Zundel, that knowledge requires that the accused actually knew. This also flows directly from the word without resort to authority: “knowing” requires that someone knows. Kosikar includes wilful blindness, which is a narrow, specific state of mind. In R. v. Brisco, the Supreme Court said wilful blindness can “substitute for actual knowledge whenever knowledge is a component of the mens rea.”[9] A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realised its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge.[10] The specific mental element of this offence has another feature: it requires knowledge of the mental or emotional state of another. A defendant’s state of mind is always to be inferred, by either circumstantial evidence or their statements. Here, the specified intent has an unusual feature because it is a mental element of a crime that requires knowledge of another’s mental or emotional state. To determine what the defendant knew, I must analyze what he must have inferred about the complainants’ states of mind. Recklessness file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/R v Gregory Allan Elliott.htm 7/43