05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) and/or any additional facts on which they are based, were not drawn to the attention of the original judge. In this case no reason at all has been offered as to why the new causes of action now relied upon, together with new evidence, were not drawn to the attention of Stephens J. In the absence of any satisfactory or convincing explanation for their omission, I do not consider that in the exercise of my discretion the plaintiff should be permitted to rely upon them in making this application for leave and in attempting to defend the arguments made by Google in this set aside application. There will be cases where a plaintiff can rely on a new cause of action if they are based on the original facts or where a plaintiff can adduce further facts that may have been known at the time of the application. This may be acceptable and in accordance with Order 1 Rule 1(A). It depends on the circumstances. A good reason might include, where due to a judgment being given in another case between the time when leave was granted on the application to set aside being made, the understanding of a particular area of law had altered. However, should I be wrong in my view as to the law and in particular on the exercise of my discretion, then given that this application may go further, I do propose to consider briefly, the new cause of action relied upon by the plaintiff when I look at the various gateways, and in particular URL3 and URL4. THE APPROACH TO A SET ASIDE APPLICATION [51] McCloskey J in Ewing v Times Newspapers Limited [2010] NIQB 65 at [7]-[8] considered the jurisdiction of the court to review an ex parte order. The relevant matters considered include the following: (i) The Supreme Court Practice Volume 1 at 58/1/3 states: "(i) An appeal from the refusal of a Master to make an ex parte order lies to the Judge in chambers.  On the other hand, where the Master has granted an order ex parte, the proper course is not to appeal, but to apply to him or another Master to set aside such order." (ii) Order 32 Rule 8 of the RSCI (NI) 1980 provides: 'The court may set aside an Order made ex parte'." In Ministry of Foreign Affairs v Vehicle Supplies Limited [1991] 1 WLR 550 at 55, the Privy Council approved what Sir John Donaldson MR had held WEA Records v Vissions Channel [1983] 1 WLR 721 at 727, namely that: "Equally there is no doubt that the High Court has power to review and to discharge or vary any order which has been made ex parte. This jurisdiction is inherent to the provisional nature of any order made ex parte and is reflected in RSC Order 32, Rule 6 …" Order 32 Rule 6 of the English Rules was the direct equivalent of Order 32 Rule 8 of our present Rules. (iii) The Supreme Court Practice Volume 1 at 32/6/30 comments: "The Court has an inherent jurisdiction to revoke leave given ex parte, e.g. if it feels that it gave its original leave under misapprehension upon new matters being drawn to its attention per Lord Denning MR in Becker v Noel (Practice Note 1971 1 WLR 830). When applying for an ex parte order it is the duty of the applicant to make full and fair disclosure to the Court of all relevant facts of which he knows and failure to do so may itself be a ground for setting aside such an order. …. file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 14/26