05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) solicitors confirming that the complaint had been sent for review and "in relation to video URL2". On 18 September 2014 YouTube Legal Support wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors noting that the video URL2 had been blocked for viewers in Northern Ireland having been considered not to comply with local law. No evidence has been adduced that would allow this court to conclude that anyone in Northern Ireland thereafter downloaded and viewed URL2. On 26 January 2015 a complaint was made about captions relating to URL2 for the first time by the plaintiff's solicitors. On 3 February 2015 access to any caption was blocked to Northern Ireland users. [15] On 21 October 2014 the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to Google's solicitors. On 22 October 2014 Google's solicitors replied to the plaintiff's solicitors confirming that it was Google's intention to dispute the jurisdiction of the courts in Northern Ireland to hear the plaintiff's claims and relying on the decision in Tamiz v Google Inc [2012] EWH 449; 2013 (EWCA Civ 68). At a review on 20 October 2014 before Stephens J, Google's solicitors had attended to represent Google's interests. Following service of the ex parte application, Mr Lockhart did attend on 23 October 2014. It was made clear that Google would dispute the jurisdiction of the courts of Northern Ireland to hear these claims. There followed an 'ex parte' application in which Google's legal team declined to take part, seeking leave to serve outside the jurisdiction in respect of a variety of claims, namely, harassment under the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 ("the 1997 Order"), libels, slanders, malicious falsehoods and breaches of the tort of misuse of private information. This was heard by Stephens J who had heard the earlier application for an injunction, which had ended, as I have noted, with the defendant giving the plaintiff an acceptable undertaking in terms which require him to refrain from certain behaviour in the future. Mr Lockhart QC on behalf of Google says that he had attended as a matter of courtesy and was not in a position to make submissions. I accept Mr Lockhart's explanation. However, I would be surprised if Google had not been alert to the omission, for example, of an averment from the grounding affidavit that the plaintiff had a good cause of action as required by Order 11 Rule 4(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (NI) 1980. For whatever reason, Google kept its powder dry and permitted the plaintiff to proceed unopposed. In any event Google could not have known that Stephens J would be given the incorrect test for granting leave out of the jurisdiction. He was told that it was an arguable case when it is now accepted that the test was much more onerous, namely a good arguable case. I have no doubt that this was an honest, if unfortunate, error on the part of counsel. It is not possible to determine what influence this had on the Judge and the decision he made. Following the granting of leave, Google has now made what can only be described as a root and branch attack on the Order. The plaintiff has chosen to defend this attack by calling in aid a "diffuse proliferation of other alleged claims against Google Inc". Google complained with some justification that these "simply obfuscate rather than illuminate the issues between the parties". The net result has been to increase judicial effort in the way in which I have described and to delay the progress of this action. This can make no sense and certainly does not comply with the imperative of Order 1 Rule 1(A) of the RSC (NI) 1980. [16] The writ of summons did not conform with Order 82 Rule 2 which requires that a writ in an action for libel "must be endorsed with a statement giving sufficient particulars of the publications in respect of which the action is brought to enable them to be identified". There was no such statement endorsed on the writ. The writ also does not comply with Order 6 Rule 2: see Chandra v Brooke North [2013] EWCA Civ 1559 at [92]. Much difficulty has been occasioned by these straightforward failures to follow the Rules. The writ was accompanied by a draft statement of claim for the service out application. This included further causes of action, some of which were not included in the writ of summons at all. There was now a specific claim for breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 ("the 1998 Act") and claims for breaches of the Data Protection Directive and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Stephens J gave leave to serve proceedings on Google outside the jurisdiction. The precise basis on which this leave was given will be described later in the judgment. [17] The statement of claim was served in a slightly amended form from the draft statement of claim on 14 November 2014 as paragraph 11 had been amended to plead libel against, inter alia, Google. On 27 November 2014 Google UK and Google Ireland Limited entered unconditional appearances. [18] On 15 December 2014 Master Bell granted leave for Google Inc to enter a conditional appearance. This was served on 22 December 2014. Meanwhile, Google UK Limited and Google Ireland Limited entered unconditional appearances on 14 November 2014. file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 4/26