32 evidence and its reasonable inferences. Duguay, 430 Mass. 397, 404 (1999). See Commonwealth v. There was no improper burden shifting. Additionally, William contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence in two instances, amounting to reversible error. Specifically, the prosecutor mistakenly stated that people came to the Lyonses' home in response to the motorcycle advertisement (they only had telephoned), and that the Lyonses received the letter alleging sexual molestation before rather than following the e-mail sent by "Brian."18 The prosecutor's two misstatements of fact did not result in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The facts were many and varied, and none of the misstatements "went to the heart of the case." Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 731 (2002). Further, the judge properly instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. 8. Consequently, reversal is not required. Speedy trial claim. Approximately two years after the defendants were charged, they moved for a dismissal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996), due to speedy trial violations. The motion judge acted well within his discretion in declining to accept defense counsels' unsworn 18 While it remains unclear from the record whether the "Brian" letter or e-mail arrived at the Lyonses first, we acknowledge there is a chance the prosecutor might have confused the sequence of events.