Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Davis & Ors v SSHD interference with the exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually taken against them.” The Investigatory Powers Tribunal has adopted the same approach in this jurisdiction: see Liberty v GCHQ and others [2015] 3 All ER 142 at paragraph 4(ii). Privilege 67. The Code of Practice issued by the Secretary of State states that communication data will not be subject to legal professional privilege since there will be no access to the contents of retained communications. The Law Society made written submissions which challenge the correctness of this statement. Reliance is placed on a dictum of Cotton LJ in Gardner v. Irvin (1878) 4 Ex D 49 at 83 where he said:“I think that the plaintiffs are not entitled to have the dates of the letters and such other particulars of the correspondence as may enable them to discover indirectly the contents of the letters, and thus to cause the defendants to furnish evidence against themselves in this action”. This approach was confirmed by Vinelott J in Derby v. Weldon (No 7) [1990] 1 WLR 1156. 68. No doubt such an example of privilege would rarely arise. However, communications with practising lawyers do need special consideration. The same in our view can properly be said to apply to communications with MPs. The Code of Practice makes clear the need for such special attention. The claimants’ case on Digital Rights Ireland 69. The Claimants make numerous criticisms of DRIPA on the merits. As we have already observed, we are not concerned with those, but with whether s 1 of the Act is incompatible with the requirements of EU law as interpreted by the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland. Ms Rose’s skeleton argument suggested that the CJEU decided that data retention legislation, if it is to be compatible with EU law, must: i) restrict retention to data which relates to public security, and in particular restrict retention to a particular time period, a geographical area and/or suspects or persons whose data would contribute to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious criminal offences [paragraph 59]; ii) provide for there to be exceptions for persons whose communications are subject to an “obligation of professional secrecy” (including Members of Parliament, lawyers and journalists) [58]; iii) restrict access and use of the data to the purposes of prevention, detection or prosecution of defined, sufficiently serious crimes [60-61]; iv) “above all” ensure that an independent administrative or judicial body carries out a prior review of decisions regarding access to the data on the basis of what is strictly necessary [62];